Suppression of Evidence in Immigration Proceedings

 

Board of Special Inquiry hearing in the early 1900s - It was not until Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952 (“the 1952 Act”), that the board of special inquiry was replaced by a solitary special inquiry officer.  See section 101(a)(4) of the 1952 Act.

Physical apprehension and detention of aliens who are in the United States without permission (i.e. without lawful immigration status) and aliens who are seeking admission to the United States without required documents or without inspection by an immigration officer are enforcement actions necessary to effectively remove such persons from the United States if such aliens are not eligible for relief from removal.

An alien in the United States without lawful immigration status is subject to arrest and detention solely based on such alien’s lack of lawful immigration status for the purpose of removing such alien from the United States.  No criminal violation or charge is required.  Likewise, no person who is not a United States citizen or national has an unfettered right to enter (or even transit through) the United States.  See section 235(a)(3) of the Immigration Act, as amended ("the Act").

Long ago the United States Supreme Court declared that deportation, as a matter of law, is not punitive:   

The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a banishment, in the sense in which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment. It is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation, acting within its constitutional authority, and through the proper departments, has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend.

Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, at 701 (1893).  See, also, Pereida v. Wilkinson, Acting Attorney General, 592 U.S. ____, at 15 (2021) (comparing the burden of proof in criminal proceedings to the burden of proof in “civil immigration proceedings”); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, at 1046 (1984) (Important as it is to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of all persons, there is no convincing indication that application of the exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings will contribute materially to that end.); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, at 594 (1952) (acknowledging deportation proceedings as civil proceedings).

This is why immigration authorities are not required to obtain judicial search and arrest warrants when attempting to arrest and detain aliens who do not enjoy legal immigration status in the United States.  See section 287(a) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1357(a)) and 8 C.F.R. 
§ 287.5(e)(2).  In general, the powers and duties of immigration officers are codified under section 287 of the Act (8 U.S.C. § 1357).  Implementing regulations can be found at 8 C.F.R. Part 287.

 
Nevertheless, the exclusionary rule might apply in civil immigration proceedings (by means of a motion to suppress) in the presence of egregious circumstances which transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence in question.  Matter of Burgos, 15 I&N Dec. 278, 279 (BIA 1975); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980); Matter of Wong, 13 I&N Dec. 820, 821 - 22 (BIA 1971); Matter of Tang, 13 I&N Dec. 691, 692 (BIA 1971).

Egregious circumstances that might justify suppression of evidence in immigration court proceedings are 
coercion, threats, abuse, or denial of food or drink, use of misinformation or long hours of interrogation in an attempt to obtain information.  See Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1977); Bong Youn Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1960); Ex Parte Jackson, 263 F. 110 (D. Montana 1920); Matter of Toro, 17 I&N Dec. 340 (BIA 1980); Matter of Garcia, 17 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA 1980); cf. Adamson v. Commissioner, 745 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984).