Substantial Evidence Standard of Review
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal reviews administrative decisions using the “substantial evidence” standard. Under the substantial evidence standard, an appellate court will uphold an administrative decision “unless it is clear[] from the totality of the circumstances” that a “reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” See section 242(b)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("the Act"); Morales v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 812, at 817 (5th Cir. 2017). Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal applies this standard to the overall administrative decision under review without distinguishing between findings of fact and application of law.
This approach also impacts credibility determinations. Mwembie v. Gonzales, 443 F. 3d 405, 410 ("[I]f the IJ's credibility determinations are supported by the record, they will be affirmed.").
Relying on INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) and section 242(b)(4)(B) of the Act, a unanimous United States Supreme Court adopted the Fifth Circuit's approach relating to the substantial evidence standard by distinguishing the restrictions on jurisdiction in section 242(a) of the Act from the restrictions on appellate review in section 242(b) of the Act:
Our decisions in Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U. S. 209 (2024), and Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221 (2020), are not to the contrary. In those cases, we held that a mixed question of law and fact could qualify as a “question of law” exempt from §1252(a)’s bar on judicial review. U. S., at 212; 589 U. S., at 225. But unlike §1252(b), §1252(a) does not speak to the standards of review for removal orders; rather, it addresses a court’s ability to review removal orders at all. As a result, whether a given issue is treated as a question of law exempt from the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions tells us nothing about thetype of review the court must afford to that issue under other provisions of the statute.
Urias-Orellana et al. v. Bondi, at pp. 12, 13.
Obviously, this is a heavy burden which seemingly must be carried up-hill from the perspective of any Petitioner.
Although Urias-Orellana originated in the First Circuit Court of Appeal, the United States Supreme Court's decision seems to reflect Fifth Circuit case law by not distinguishing between fact finding and the application of law by the administrative decision maker when determining whether a reasonable adjudicator would be "compelled to conclude to the contrary." See section 242(b)(4)(B) of the Act.